Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 12 by David M. Cutler
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 12
Volume Author/Editor: James M. Poterba, editor
Volume Publisher: MIT Press
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/pote98-1
Publication Date: January 1998
Chapter Title: Cost Shifting or Cost Cutting? The Incidence of Reductions
in Medicare Payments
Chapter Author: David M. Cutler
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10911





Harvard University and NBER
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper examines how reductions in hospital payments by Medicare
affect hospital operations. I look at two episodes of payment reductions:
the late 1980s and the early 1990s. I find a large difference in the impact
of payment reductions in these two time periods. In the 1980s, reduced
Medicare payments were offset dollar for dollar by increased prices to
private insurers. In the 1990s, however, payment reductions result in
lower hospital profits, which must ultimately reduce hospital costs. Hos-
pitals have responded to the payment reductions by reducing the num-
ber of beds and nurses, and sometimes by closing entirely, but not by
reduced acquisition of high-tech equipment.
1. INTRODUCTION
Because Medicare is such a large part of the federal budget, federal
deficit reduction measures necessarily look to Medicare for cost savings.
This paper was prepared for the National Bureau of Economic Research conference on Tax
Policy and the Economy, November 1997. I am grateful to Dan Altman for outstanding
research assistance, and to Jim Poterba and Doug Staiger for helpful comments. This
research was supported by grants from the National Institutes on Aging, the Common-
wealth Foundation, and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to the National Bureau of
Economic Research.2Cutler
In a series of deficit reduction measures in the mid-1980s, in the Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990, in the OBRA of 1993, and
again in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, cuts in Medicare were an
essential component of fiscal policy. In all of these cases, Medicare cuts
were achieved primarily by paying providers less for the same services;
changes in costs to beneficiaries have been minimal.
While cutting provider payments seems like a natural way to help
balance the budget, there has been little work on the implications of
these payment cuts. Are the cost savings from the public sector passed
on to private insurers, in the form of higher charges for their patients?
Or do cuts in Medicare translate into reduced hospital services? The
public-policy implications of cutting Medicare depend critically on this
answer. If cuts in Medicare just increase private insurance premiums,
the cut is just a disguised tax increase to pay for Medicare. If Medicare
cuts reduce service quality or care for the uninsured, however, the cuts
could have very important effects on the medical system.
Research on the effect of Medicare payment reforms does not provide
a clear answer to this question. On the one hand is evidence that the
physical inputs hospitals provide are sensitive to reimbursement rates.
Feder, Hadley, and Zuckerman (1987), for example, show that the im-
plementation of the Prospective Payment System (PPS) reduced hospi-
tal inputsparticularly the length of hospital stayssubstantially.
Other studies, reviewed in Coelen and Gaumer (1991), reach a similar
conclusion. On the other hand is the widespread belief that hospitals
frequently shift costs from public to private payers when public reim-
bursement becomes less generous. Research from the late 1980s, for
example, documented that at that time, Medicare payment was about
10 percent below hospital costs, and Medicaid payment was about 20
percent below costs, with private insurers paying about 30 percent
above costs (Prospective Payment Assessment Commission, 1994). If
such cost shifting were complete, it would eliminate the need for cost
cutting in response to Medicare payment reductions.
Understanding the incidence of Medicare cuts is particularly important
because of the growing role of managed care in the medical care system.
Figure 1 shows the nature of private health insurance over the past two
decades. In 1980, over 90 percent of the population was enrolled in un-
managed fee-for-service (FFS) insurance, with a small residual in a health
maintenance organization (HMO). By 1992, most fee-for-service insur-
ance was "managed" (generally with utilization review procedures), and
total fee-for-service enrollment was only about one-half of private insur-
ance. The remainder was group- and staff-model HMOs, along with pre-















FIGURE 1. Changes in Private-Health-Plan Enrollment
was only 25 percent of the privately insured population, with HMOs
particularly those with an out-of-network (points-of-service) option
becoming the dominant insurance source of private insurance. By control-
ling where patients are admitted to hospitals and negotiating more strenu-
ously with providers, managed-care insurers might prevent the type of
cost shifting that traditional indenmity insurers could not. As managed
care comes to dominate the medical care system, therefore, payment
reductions may translate more immediately into cost reductions, with
implications for both Medicare and non-Medicare patients.
In this paper, I examine empirically the economic implications of re-
duced Medicare payments to hospitals. I begin by forming a measure of
the Medicare bite for each hospitalthe reduction in Medicare payments
resulting from policy actions. Medicare payment per hospital admission
is based on the diagnosis-related group (DRG) system: each patient is
placed in a single DRG, and the payment to the hospital is the product of
the severity of that DRG and a conversion factor that translates DRG
weights into dollars. Over time, the conversion factor was designed to
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increase with the cost of medical inputs that hospitals purchase. But
recent deficit reduction measures have reduced the increase in this up-
date factor. The difference between the growth of the hospital market
basket and the actual growth of Medicare payments, times the hospital's
number of Medicare patients, is the measure of the Medicare bite.
I analyze the effect of Medicare payment reductions in two periods:
the late 1980s (1985-1990), and the early 1990s (1990-1995). The Medi-
care bite in the late 1980s averaged $175 per patient in the hospital (both
Medicare and non-Medicare patients), while in the early 1990s the bite
averaged $121 per patient in the hospital.
I first examine whether these Medicare cuts were shifted onto private
payers or whether they resulted in lower hospital costs. I find a striking
difference between the effect of cuts in the 1980s and in the 1990s. In the
1980s, cuts in Medicare were entirely shifted to private payers; there
does not appear to be any cost cutting resulting from the payment reduc-
tion. In the 1990s, however, there is much less cost shifting. Cuts appear
to be met almost entirely from lower hospital costs, rather than by cost
shifting. This is consistent with the growing role of managed care in
private insurance. Indeed, I show that in the 1990s, cost shifting is less
prevalent in areas of the country where managed care is higher than in
areas where managed care is smaller.
I then examine which services are cut back when Medicare payments
are reduced. I focus predominantly on the early 1990s, since that is the
period where cost cutting is more substantial. I find that some hospitals
responded to payment cuts by closing entirely, although the magnitude
of this change was small. More commonly, hospitals responded by re-
ducing the number of beds and reducing nursing personnel. I find no
evidence that over this time period Medicare cuts reduced the diffusion
of high-tech care or led hospitals to shut emergency rooms or trauma
centers predominantly serving the poor.
The paper is structured as follows. I begin in the next section by
describing the basics of Medicare payment and what it means to "cut"
Medicare. The second section presents a simple model of cost shifting
and cost cutting in response to reduced Medicare payments. In the third
section, I consider whether Medicare cuts were shifted to private insur-
ers or whether they resulted in lower hospital costs. The fourth section
then examines how hospitals reduced costs. The last section concludes.
2. THE BASICS OF MEDICARE PAYMENT
To understand what "cutting Medicare" involves, it is necessary to go
into some detail on Medicare pricing. The simplest example of MedicareIncidence of Medicare Reductions5
pricing is for hospital services; this is also the area where Medicare cuts
are largest so the issue is most salient. In the empirical work below, I
focus exclusively on reductions in payments to hospitals.
Since 1984, Medicare payments to hospitals have been made on a PPS
basis. Each hospital admission is categorized into one of roughly 470
DRGs. The DRGs are assigned a relative weight, based on average costs
of treating people in that DRG in previous years. The average weight is
about 1. Payments to hospitals are a product of the DRG weight and a
factor that converts weights into dollars:
paymentl,h = P DRG weight1, (1)
where i is the patient and h is the hospital. The conversion factor h
varies somewhat across hospitalsfor example, between rural and ur-
ban hospitalsbut not by a great deal. The variation in payments within
a DRG across hospitals is not very high.
Over time, the growth of the conversion factor, known as the PPS
update, is designed to increase roughly in line with the "market basket"
of goods and services that hospitals purchase.1 But in an effort to save
money, the government has periodically increased hospital payments by
less than the market-basket increase.
Table 1 shows the nature of these changes. In virtually every year of
the late 1980s, there were significant Medicare cuts. In part these cuts
were designed to save money, and in part they offset initial hospital
responses to the implementation of PPS. When PPS was implemented,
hospitals quickly found out that they could receive additional payments
if they "upcoded" their patients into more highly weighted DRGs. For
example, hospitals were reimbursed greater amounts for patients with a
complication and/or comorbidity than for patients without any complica-
tions, despite the fact that the treatment received might be the same.
Thus, there was a concerted effort in many hospitals to record complica-
tions and comorbidities more carefully (Carter and Ginsburg, 1985). The
result was that Medicare spending was much greater than anticipated,
leading to corrective measures to reduce the update factor.
The most important Medicare payment changes in the 1980s were CO-
1The actual process is somewhat more complicated. A recommendation about update
factors is made by the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission (ProPAC) and by the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), and is then approved by Congress. The
expected growth of the market basket is the principal factor involved in the ProPAC and
HCFA recommendations, although both groups also look at several other factors, includ-
ing cost-increasing scientific and technological advances, how much DRG upcoding there
has been, and whether to create "incentives" for hospital productivity improvements.6Cutler
TABLE 1
Provisions of Legislation Reducing Medicare Pa!iments
()MB is the increase in the market basket. Savings are as estimated by the CBO at the time the
legislation was passed.
BRA85 (the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act), OBRA87
(the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act), and OBRA89. In each case,
Medicare savings were about $10 billion. As the third column of the table
shows, about one-half of these savings are from reductions in Part A
spendingspending for inpatient hospitals, skilled nursing facilities,
and hospices. In practice, most of the Part A savings are from reduced
update factors to hospitals. The remaining spending changes were largely
reduced payments to physicians.
The 1990s were marked by Medicare payment reductions with the
explicit goal of deficit reduction. OBRA9O made even larger cuts in Medi-
care spending. OBRA9O was the first legislation to have significant in-
creases in Medicare revenues ($27 bfflion out of $70 billion total). But
even with some revenue increases, reductions in Part A costsand in
particular update payments to hospitalswere an important part of the
legislation. As the last column shows, the update factor was reduced by









COBRA85 13 6 5 Reduced medical education pay-
ments: delayed transition to PPS
OBRA87 10 4 3 Reduced update in 1988, 1989
OBRA89 11 1 2 Reduction in DRG weights; change in
update factors in 1990
OBRA9O 70 13 10 Reduced updates in 1991-1993 (Large
and urban: 1991: MB-2%; 1992:
MB-1.6%; 1993: MB-1.55%; Rural:
1991: MB-0.7%; 1992: MB-0.6%;
1993: MB-0.55%; 1994: MB+1.5%)
OBRA93 56 28 28 Reduced updates in 1994-1997 (Ur-
ban: 1994: MB-2.5%; 1995:
MB-2.5%; 1996: MB-2%; 1997:
MB-0.5%; Rural: 1994: MB-1.0%;
1995: bring to urban level).
BBA97 116 40 17Source: Prospective Payment Assessment Commission.
Incidence of Medicare Reductions7
OBRA93 continued this trend towards greater reductions in update
factors. OBRA93 reduced update factors for 1994-1997 by up to 2.5
percentage points per year, although rural hospitals did not have their
payments reduced as much. Half of the overall savings in Medicare from
this legislation were a result of the reductions in update factors.
Finally, the Balanced Budget Agreement of 1997 made significant cuts
in Medicare. Forty billion dollars of the $116 billion total reduction in
Medicare payments came from Part A cuts, with a large share of that
from reduced update factors.
The net effect of these changes on the hospital update factor is shown
in Table 2 and Figure 2. Beginning in 1986, update factors were reduced
substantially below the level of the market-basket increase. The largest
reductions were between 1985 and 1990, when the update factor grew
about 2 percentage points annually less rapidly than the market basket.
There was a further divergence in the 1990s. Between 1990 and 1995, the
update factor increased by an average of 0.6 percentage points less rap-
idly annually than the market-basket index. The reductions in the up-
date factor were generally greater for urban than for rural hospitals, but
these differences were usually not very large. In the subsequent analy-
sis, I analyze separately the impact of payment cuts in the 1985-1990 and
1990-1995 periods.
To quantify the overall importance of these payment reductions, I
form a measure of the Medicare bite-the impact of Medicare cuts on
TABLE 2















1988 4.7 1.5 1.5 1.0 3.0
1989 5.5 3.3 3.4 2.9 3.9
1990 4.6 4.7 4.4 3.7 8.4
1991 4.3 3.4 3.2 3.2 4.5
1992 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.8 3.8
1993 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.6 3.6
1994 2.5 2.0 1.8 1.8 3.3
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FIGURE 2. The Market Basket and Growth of the Update Factor
each hospital. I start with Medicare reimbursement in the hospital in a
base year, t7. In the absence of Medicare cuts, Medicare payments per
privately insured patient would grow at the rate of market-basket in-
crease, or H (1 + mb). Because of the Medicare cuts, however, the
actual growth of payments was only H (1 + acts). The difference be-
tween these two is the effect of Medicare cuts on the hospital:
I2
(medicare bite)1,2 = (medicare revenue)1Lii
(1 + mb)- fT(1 + act)
tl tl
Note that the factor in square brackets is the same for all hospitals
(with the exception of urban versus rural status), so that most of the
variation across hospitals is due to differences in Medicare revenue
across hospitals. Note also that the Medicare bite variable is defined
entirely as of time t1. Thus, nothing that the hospital does between t1 and
t2 to change Medicare reimbursement or the mix of patients admitted to
the hospital wifi affect the measure.TABLE 3
Summary Statistics on Medicare Bite
Incidence of Medicare Reductions9
Note: The bite is the reduction in Medicare revenues divided by the total number of patients admitted
to the hospital. Observations are weighted by the number of patients admitted to the hospital.
An important issue is the scale for the bite measurewhat is the base
over which the Medicare bite should be measured. In gauging the over-
all impact of the Medicare cuts on the hospital, it is most natural to form
the Medicare bite per total patient in the hospital. For other purposes,
however, it will be more natural to examine Medicare cuts per Medicare
patient or per private patient, as I discuss below.
Data on hospital revenues, expenditures, and admissions are from
Medicare cost reports.2 Cost reports are ified annually by each hospital
and can be obtained from the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA). The cost reports have a wealth of important information
including total patient revenues and expenses, and Medicare revenues
and expensesbut they are not without problems. There are extremely
large outliers for many variables that appear to be due to misreporting
rather than true differences across hospitals.3 For all of the variables in
the analysis, I have eliminated very large outliers from the sample. I drop
observations that lie outside two standard deviations of the mean in any
of the basic accounting figures from the PPS data. I next drop a tail
consisting of the top 5 percent of the dependent variables and a trivial
number of outliers in the bite variable (about three or four) in each year.
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the Medicare bite per total pa-
tient. In the 1985-1990 period, the bite averaged -$175, with a standard
deviation of $89. In the 1990-1995 period, the bite was smaller (because
the reduction in payments was smaller), averaging only $121. But the
standard deviation was still large ($61).
2The cost reports are the only source of data on hospital revenues.
Some hospitals, for example, wifi report millions of dollars of Medicare revenue but only




Standard deviation $89 $61
Minimum -$1 $0
Maximum -$500 -$464
Number of hospitals 3,355 2,92510Cutler
3. THE INCIDENCE OF MEDICARE CUTS
Before analyzing the incidence of Medicare cuts empirically, I discuss
what type of effects we might expect to observe from Medicare cuts. I
consider a simple model of hospital decision making. A hospital treats
three types of patients: Medicare patients, privately insured patients,
and uninsured patients. Under the DRG system, Medicare has adminis-
tered prices; thus the hospital has no leverage over the price received
from Medicare. The hospital does have some leverage in the prices it
charges to private insurers. I assume the hospital faces a downward-
sloping demand curve for private patients. Subject to this demand curve
and the hospital's costs, the hospital chooses a price for its services.
Figure 3 shows the market for privately insured patients. The demand
curve is labeled D, with corresponding marginal revenue of MR. Patient
care costs are c. The price the hospital charges determines the profits it
wifi earn. At P=c, there are no profits. As P increases, profits increase,
up to the profit-maximizing pointmax(the quantity where marginal
revenue is equal to cost). Above this price, profits again fall.
In addition to profits from private patients, hospitals also receive prof-
its (or losses) from Medicare. I assume that Medicare profits areM'
Price
FIGURE 3. The Market for Privately Insured PatientsServices
Incidence of Medicare Reductions11
C Pm Price
FIGURE 4. Determination of the Optimal Price
independent of the price the hospital charges to private patients. The
hospital uses Medicare and private profits to finance other activities
care for the uninsured, teaching, research, or investment in new tech-
nologies. The hospital is always making zero profits, but the "residual
claimants" on the hospital's income are these other activities. Figure 4
graphs these subsidies as a function of the price charged to private
payers. If prices to private payments equal costs, the hospital will make a
profit of ITM, which is defined here as a positive number although it could
be negative.
The price the hospital wifi choose depends on the objectives of the
hospital. It is generally agreed that profit-maximizing firms wifi set
price equal tomax'with the profits going to the hospital's owners. But
most hospitals are not for profit. Thus, the objective function of the
hospital is not as certain. I assume that the hospital values both lower
prices to private payers and more of the other activities. Lower prices
are a form of "charity care": by not charging privately insured patients
the profit-maximizing price, the hospital is donating money to pri-
vately insured patients. Profits are valuable because they allow the
hospital to better serve its (self-perceived) mission. A hospital that cares




Cost cutting Indifference Curve
FIGURE 5. Effect of Medicare Cuts on Prices and Services
The equilibrium is for the hospital to choose point E, where it earns
some profits from privately insured patients but does not charge the
profit-maximizing price.
Now consider a reduction in Medicare payments. As Figure 5 shows,
this can be represented as a shift down of the profit curve. The utility-
maximizing hospital wifi both reduce its "charity" care to private pa-
tients (that is, increase the prices it charges them) and reduce its profits.
With the general utility function, both of these responses would occur.
The effect of Medicare payment reductions on increasing prices to pri-
vate patients is termed cost shifting. The effect of payment reductions on
reduced profits, and thus the ability of the hospital to pursue its other
missions, is termed cost cutting. I consider what this involves in more
detail in section 5.
One corner solution to the hospital's problem is worth noting. Sup-
pose that the hospital has a fixed amount C1 it needs to spend on a given
purpose (for example, care for the uninsured). In this case, the hospital's
utility function will be flat at Cfr and the entire amount of the price
change would be shifted to private patients. Thus, there wifi be perfect
cost shifting.




Pricewhere demand for hospital care is relatively inelastic. Recent changes in
the medical care marketplacein particular the rise of managed care
have likely changed the demand elasticity. While managed care has
many effects on the medical care system, the most important effect for
this analysis is that it makes patients more responsive to price increases
at particular hospitals. Consider what happens in Figure 5 if the market
for hospital services is more elastic. I show the profit schedule for this
market in Figure 6. The profit schedule both has a lower peak (because
maximum profits are smaller) and is flatter (because the same increase in
price wifi result in a smaller increase in profits). As Figure 6 shows,
Medicare cuts in this market wifi result in more cost cutting and less cost
shifting than Medicare cuts in the market with less elastic demand. The
reason for this is that the increased demand elasticity raises the loss to
the hospital of shifting a dollar of costs relative to the loss to the hospital
from having lower profits. Indeed, as managed care spreads and the
hospital extracts all of the revenues possible from private insurers, the
entire amount of Medicare reduction wifi result in cost cutting. Cost









FIGURE 6. Effect of Medicare Cuts in a More Competitive Market14Cutler
4. COST SHIFTING OR COST CUTTING?
In this section, I test whether Medicare payment reductions have been
shifted to other payers or whether they have lowered hospital profits. I
group all non-Medicare patients as "private" patients even though some
of them have insurance through other government programs (such as
Medicaid). In the cost-report data, I am not able to separate out the non-
Medicare revenues, however, so I combine the two in the estimation.
Revenue changes are formed using the following equation:
(private revenue change \=(private revenue
no. of private patients )t1,t2V no. of private patients)2
I-(private revenue
no. of private patientsIt1
Al
x A 1 + average private revenue growth)
tl,t2
where the average private revenue growth is the average change in
revenues per patient between t1 and t2. I form cost changes analogously.
By definition, the average revenue change per private patient and aver-
age cost change per private patient will be zero.
One natural test of the division between cost shifting and cost cutting
is to relate the Medicare bite to revenue and cost changes. One could
estimate regressions of the form
(private revenue change '
k. no. of private patients)t1,t2
= p0 +, (
(private cost change
'
no. of private patients)t1,t2
= 70 +
medicare bite
no. of private patients)t1,t2
(medicare bite
no. of private patients)t1,t2
The cost-shifting theory implies that131 =1 and Yi =0: a $1 reduction in
Medicare revenues per private patient should lead to a $1 increase inrevenues per private patient (recall that the Medicare bite is measured as
a negative number) but no change in private costs per private patient.
Cost cutting, in contrast, implies that f3 =0 and Yi = 1: private revenues
are unaffected by the Medicare cut, but private costs fall dollar for dollar
with Medicare cuts.
The most important difficulty in estimating these equations is the
problem of "case mix" differences (the severity of admissions) across
hospitals. If a hospital's patient mix becomes more severely ill, both
costs and revenues wifi increase. If the change in case mix is correlated
with the Medicare bite measure, this will result in biased estimates of
andThere is reason to believe the Medicare bite variable wifi be
correlated with case mix change. The bite measure is closely related to
the initial case mix of the hospitala hospital with a less intensive case
mix will have lower Medicare revenues than a hospital with a more
intensive case mix. If there is a tendency for low case mix hospitals to
have more rapid growth of case mixeither because of regression to the
mean in patient severity or because they acquire technologies that then
allow them to treat more severely ifi patientsa smaller bite variable wifi
be systematically correlated with more rapid growth of revenues and
expenses, creating a spurious negative correlation on the bite variable.
To address this issue, I examine a weaker form of the hypothesis. I
take advantage of the fact that changes in case mix should affect costs
and revenues equally Thus, if we control for the change in costs, the
change in revenues will indicate whether there is cost shifting or not. If
there is no cost shifting, the implication is that there must be cost cut-
ting. In particular, I estimate equations of the form
(private revenue change'\
no. of private patients)t,t2
)-tl,t2
(private cost change
no. of private patients
+
(
Incidence of Medicare Reductions15
medicare bite
no. of private patients)1,2
+ X6 + ,
where a coefficient of 62 = 1 means full cost shifting, and 62 =0 means
no cost shifting and thus cost cutting. Indeed, we can constrain this
equation further by imposing a coefficient of 1 on 8; this constraint
eliminates bias in the estimate of 3 that would result from measurement
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FIGURE 7. Non-Medicare Revenue Change minus Cost Change versus
Bite, 1985-1990
separately, since we cannot look separately at cost and revenue changes;
but this specification eliminates the potential for case mix change to bias
the results.
Figure 7 shows the relation between the change in private revenues
per private patient and the Medicare bite per privatepatient in the 1985-
1990 period. Figure 8 shows an analogous relation for the 1990-1995
period. There is a clear difference in the relation between these variables
over time. In the 1980s, Medicare cuts areassociated with increased
revenues for private insurers. This is not true inthe 1990s; in that period,
there appears to be no relation between the variables.
Table 4 shows regression versions of these equations. In addition to
the bite variable, I include the share of people in the MSA who are
enrolled in managed careeither an HMO or a PPOas well as con-
trols for whether the hospital is for profit, private not for profit, or
government-owned. The managed-care data are from Interstudy. Fi-
nally, I include controls (not reported) for the number of beds in the
hospital (divided into groups of <25, 25-100, 100-200, 200-300, 300-
400, 400-500, 500-600, and >600) and the size of the MSA the hospital is
located in (<150k people, 150k-300k, 300k-600k, 600k-900k, 900k-
1 .5M, and >1 .5M). The first three columns report regressions forthe
change in revenues between 1985 and 1990; the second three colunms
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FIGURE 8. Non-Medicare Revenue Change minus Cost Change versus
Bite, 1990-1995
TABLE 4
The EffectofMedicare Cuts on Private Revenues(a)
(a)Depefldeflt variable: change in private revenues per private patient.
Note: In the column 2 we imposed a coefficient of 1 on cost changes. Column 3 in each set is for MSAs
only. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Variable
1985-1990 1990-1995
1 2 3 1 2 3
Cost change 0.93 1.00 0.89 0.95 1.00 0.95
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)




(0.36) (0.35) (0.55) (0.83) (0.82) (1.38)
HMO enroll-1,2161,0531,5361,3861,1171,724
ment (304) (303) (406) (462) (462) (646)
Ownership:
Forprofit143179200 438 532 646
(84) (86) (126) (122) (121) (200)
Govern- 160 134 80 76 7238
ment (86) (86) (160) (122) (123) (243)
N 3,352 3,352 1,361 2,922 2,922 1,079
R2 .625 .035 .609 .790 .023 .762
-40000 -
-obo -400 -2b018Cutler
cient on the cost change variable while the second column imposes a
coefficient of 8 = 1. The third column is for the rural sample only.
The table confirms the change in relation between Medicare cuts and
private revenues. In the 1985-1990 period, every $1 reduction in Medi-
care revenues is associated with a $2 increase in private revenues,both
with and without the constraint on private cost changes. This suggests
cost shifting of more than dollar-for-dollar, although much of the addi-
tional effect above $1 is a result of the rural sample of hospitals. In the
urban sample, where competition is more prevalent, the effect suggests
dollar-for-dollar cost shifting. In the 1990-1995 period, in contrast, there
is no evidence of cost shifting. Indeed, the coefficient on the Medicare
bite is actually positive.
The other variables are also in line with expectations. In areas with
more managed-care enrollment, revenues increase lessrapidly given
costs. The effect on for-profit hospitals is different in the two time peri-
ods, and government hospitals generally do not have more or less rapid
revenue growth than private, not-for-profit hospitals.
These findings are consistent with a change in the ability to cost-shift
associated with the rise in managed care. To test this prediction further,
Table 5 repeats the regressions in Table 4, adding an interaction term
TABLE 5
The Effect of Medicare Cuts on Private Revenues(a)
(')Dependent variable: change in private revenues per private patient.
Note: In the second column we imposed a coefficient of 1 on cost changes. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
1985-1990 1990-1995
Variable 1 2 1 2
Cost change 0.93 1.00 0.95 1.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Medicare bite per -2.38 -2.72 2.27 1.62
private patient (0.52) (0.51) (1.14) (1.14)
Medicare bite 0.78 0.43 11.45 11.19
(2.35) (2.36) (5.62) (5.65)
Managed-care -1,075 -975 -94 147
enrollment (521) (522) (785) (788)
Ownership:
For profit -141 -179 443 537
(84) (84) (122) (121)
Government 160 136 77 73
(86) (86) (122) (123)
N 3,352 3,352 2,922 2,922
R2 .625 .035 .791 .024between the Medicare bite variable and managed care enrollment in that
MSA.4 If managed care has reduced the ability to cost-shift, the coefficient
on the interaction-term between the Medicare bite and managed care
should be positivein areas with more managed care enrollment the
degree of cost shifting should fall. This is indeed what the results suggest.
In the 1990s, the ability to cost-shift declines as managed-care enrollment
rises: a 10-percentage-point increase in managed care enrollment is associ-
ated with a reduction in the cost-shifting coefficient of $1. The greater
effect of managed care on the ability to cost-shift in the 1990s is consistent
with increased stringency of managed care over this time period.
In both Tables 4 and 5, there is some evidence that Medicare cuts in
the 1990s may be associated with reductions in non-Medicare revenues,
not just that the two are independent. While this seems at first im-
plausible, it may actually reflect a response of managed care to earlier
Medicare cuts. Over the 1980s, private insurers paid more when Medi-
care payments were cut. As managed care spreads, it may reverse this
initial round of cost shifting. Since hospitals with big payment cuts in
the 1980s may be the same institutions with big payment cuts in the
1990s, this reversal of earlier cost shifting would be correlated with the
non-Medicare bite in the 1990s.
In addition to shifting costs onto private payers, hospitals that receive
reductions in Medicare reimbursement might shift costs back onto Medi-
care. There are several ways that this type of cost shifting might be accom-
plished. One method is the type of upcoding noted above. Hospitals with
greater cuts in Medicare reimbursement might do more cost shifting than
hospitals with smaller cuts in Medicare reimbursement. Alternatively,
hospitals might increase the volume of services for which Medicare pay-
ment is greater than marginal cost. Since Medicare payments are based on
average costs within a DRG, if a DRG has particularly highfixed costs, the
DRG payment wifi exceed marginal costs. For many medical procedures
(particularly intensive treatments), fixed costs can be very high.
Finally, providers might increase Medicare reimbursement by unbundl-
ing the DRG payment. Medicare makes no additional DRG amount if
some services are provided in the hospital but wifi pay more if the services
are out of the hospital. For example, the hospital receives the DRG pay-
ment for patients with a hip fracture regardless of whether rehabilitation
services are provided during the acute-care episode or separate from that
episode. But Medicare wifi reimburse separately rehabilitation services
provided in a rehabilitation hospital, or in the rehabilitation unit of an
acute-care hospital. As a result, hospitals that shift from providing reha-
Managed-care enrollment is assumed to be zero outside of MSAs.
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TABLE 6
The Effect of Medicare Cuts on Medicare Revenues(a)
(a)Dependent variable: change in medicare revenues per medicare patient.
Note: Regressions impose a coefficient of 1 on cost changes. Standard errors are in parentheses.
bilitation services in the main hospital setting to providing those services
in a separate rehabilitation unit (or transferring them to a separate hospi-
tal) wifi receive increased revenues at the same cost.
Table 6 tests the theory that Medicare cuts are cost-shifted to other
parts of the Medicare program. I regress the change in Medicare reve-
nues per Medicare patient on the Medicare bite per Medicare patient.
The specification is
nedicare revenue change'\
no. of medicare patients )1,2
= 0 + 01(
medicare cost change \





A coefficient of 02= -1 would indicate full shifting of costs onto Medicare,
while a coefficient of 02=0 would indicate no cost shifting onto Medicare.
Because the Medicare cost change per Medicare patient is very noisy, I
show only results imposing a coefficient of 02= 1.
As Table 6 shows, in neither time period is there evidence of cost
shifting onto Medicare. Indeed, the evidence is more consistent with
Variable 1985-1990 1990-1995
Cost change per Medicare patient 1.00 1.00
Medicare bite per Medicare patient 7.85 1.51
(0.21) (0.76)
HMO enrollment 1,779 159
(156) (174)
Ownership:





R2 .329 .077Incidence of Medicare Reductions21
additional reductions in Medicare revenues in hospitals facing Medicare
cuts than with cost shifting.
In summary, the results on cost shifting suggest a clear conclusion: in
the 1980s, Medicare cuts were offset dollar for dollar by increases in costs
to private insurers. By the early to mid-1990s, however, cost shifting was
essentially eliminated. The difference between the 1980s and the 1990s is
in the rise of managed care. In the fee-for-service era of the 1980s, public-
sector payment reductions could be shifted to private payers if the need
arose. In the managed-care era of the 1990s, that is no longer true. The
implication is that Medicare cuts in the 1990s may have more effect on
hospital operations than Medicare cuts in the 1980s. I turn to this ques-
tion next.
5. MEDICARE CUTS AND HOSPITAL SERVICES
The finding that cost cutting, rather than cost shifting, is the dominant
mechanism for adjusting to Medicare payment reductions in the 1990s
raises the question of how hospitals are reducing costs. Cost cutting
might happen in two ways. First, providers might respond to lower
Medicare payments by paying factors of production (physicians, nurses,
orderlies, etc.) less. Since some of payment to medical care providers is a
return on past investment, provider payments can fall substantially in
the short run with no change in supply. This type of change is just a
transfer from medical care providers to the government.
Alternatively, hospitals might cut costs by reducing services. The ser-
vice cut could be across the board, or differential for some groups of
patients. A major public policy concern is whether hospitals respond to
Medicare cuts by cutting back on care to the poor. For example, hospitals
might use Medicare surpluses to run unprofitable emergency rooms or
neonatal intensive-care units. Medicare cuts might reduce hospital invest-
ment more generally, however. These cuts would have important impli-
cations for the nature of medical care throughout the health system.
A related concern is that some hospitals wifi close or reduce their size
as a result of Medicare cuts. Closure of hospitals has been increasingly
common over the 1990s, and this might be due in some part to cutbacks
in Medicare reimbursement. Reductions in the number of impatient
beds have been even more common.
To examine how Medicare cuts affect hospital behavior, I merge the
Medicare cost report data with data from the American Hospital Associa-
tion's (AHA) annual survey of hospitals. The AHA data contain informa-
tion on technology owned by the hospital and characteristics such as
employment of nurses.22Cutler
Table 7 examines whether cuts in Medicare reimbursement are associ-
ated with reductions in the size of hospitals. The first column in each
grouping estimates a logit model for the probability that the hospital
closed over the indicated time period. I relate this to the same variables
as in the previous tables. If Medicare cuts induced hospitals to close, the
coefficient would be negative. In both of these time periods, about 8
percent of hospitals closed. The evidence suggests that recent Medicare
cuts have had some effect on hospitals closing. In the 1980s, there is no
relation between the Medicare bite and closures. In the 1990s, however,
greater Medicare cuts significantly increase the probability that a hospi-
tal closes. While the effect is present, however, the overall magnitude is
relatively small. A one standard deviation increase in Medicare bite in-
creases the probability that a hospital closes by only 0.3 percentage
points.
The second column in each grouping examines whether the hospital
reduced the number of inpatient beds in response to Medicare cut-
backs. A positive coefficient would indicate that a larger Medicare bite
is associated with a greater reduction in hospital beds. I find no evi-
dence of such a reduction. Indeed, the coefficient in both time periods
is actually negative.
The discussion above suggested particular concern about how Medi-
TABLE 7
The Effect of Medicare Cuts on Hospital Structure(a)
(a)Dependent variable: change in Medicare revenues per Medicare Patient.
Note: The first and third columns are logit models for the probability that the hospital closes in the
indicated time period. The second and fourth columns are ordinary least-squares models for the











Medicare bite per .0014 - .000038 - .0060 - .000067
Medicare patient (.0022) (.000097) (.0033) (.00025)
HMO enrollment 1.63 .069 0.30 - .004
(0.91) (.036) (0.73) (.047)
Ownership:
For profit .264 .019 .176 .000
(.205) (.010) (.180) (.012)
Government - .828 -.015 - .527 - .015
(.283) (.010) (.247) (.012)
N 4,150 3,355 4,016 2,925
R2/ln(likelihood) -565.28 .041 -777.28 .052Incidence of Medicare Reductions23
TABLE 8
The Effect of Medicare Cuts on Hospital Services
Note: The first two rows are ordinary least-squares estimates of the effect of the Medicare bite on the
change in the logarithm of nursing employment per patient day in the hospital. The next two rows are
logit models for the acquisition of particular services. Cardiac services are angioplasty, open-heart sur-
gery, and cardiac catheterization. Diagnostic radiology is CT scanners, MRIs, PET scanners, and SPECT
scanners. The last row is a logit model for whether the hospital eliminates emergency services, either an
emergency room or a trauma center. In each of the technology regressions, data are pooled across
technologies. Standard errors are corrected for multiple observations on the same hospital and are
reported in parentheses.
care cuts affect the internal structure of the hospitalthe amount of care
devoted to patients, and the acquisition of particular technologies. I
examine this question directly on Table 8. The first two rows of the table
show the effect of Medicare payment changes on the change in the
logarithm of the number of full-time-equivalent-employment registered
nurses (RNs) and licensed practical nurses (LPNs) per inpatient day.
RNs are more skilled (and earn more) than LPNs, so that hospitals might
substitute LPNs for RNs. Reductions in Medicare generosity are associ-
ated with reductions in the amount of nursing input. In both time peri-
ods, hospitals with larger Medicare cuts have more rapid declines in
nursing input per patient day. While the standard errors are larger in the
1990s than in the 1980s, the coefficients are similar in the two time
periods. A one-standard-deviation increase in the Medicare bite is associ-















LI ln(RNs) .00054 2,678 0.022 .000732,243 0.020
(.00019) (.00052)










Emergency .00282 5,358-1,665.89 .008814,494-594.91
care (.00202) (.00770)24Cutler
The remaining three rows of the table show the effect of Medicare cuts
on particular technologies owned by hospitals. As Cutler and Schemer
(1998) show, a number of important medical technologies diffused over
the 1980s and 1990s. Cutler and Sheiner find the diffusion of these
technologies to be particularly sensitive to HMO enrollment in the state.
These technologies might thus also be sensitive to Medicare reimburse-
ment. I group the technologies into two groups: cardiac services (angio-
plasty, cardiac catheterization, and open-heart surgery) and diagnostic
radiology (CT scanners, MRI scanners, PET scanners, and SPECT scan-
ners). I estimate one coefficient for the effect of Medicare cuts on the
diffusion of cardiac technologies, and a separate coefficient for the effect
on diagnostic radiology services. Because I pooi data across these tech-
nologies, there are more observations in these regressions than in the
previous regressions. In each case, I correct the standard errors for the
fact that I have multiple observations on the same hospitals. The table
shows little evidence that Medicare payment changes have affected the
diffusion of these technologies. The coefficients have different signs in
the two equations, and none are statistically significant. It thus does not
appear that Medicare cuts have had a substantial effect on the diffusion
of intensive technology.
A related concern is whether Medicare cuts have induced hospitals to
cut back on care for the poor. As Medicare becomes less generous, it may
be increasingly difficult for hospitals to provide care to the uninsured.
Hospitals might respond by discouraging these patients from being ad-
mitted to the hospital. I test for this effect by examining whether reduc-
tions in Medicare reimbursement are associated with hospital decisions
to drop two components of emergency care: the emergency room, and
its status as a trauma center. Since the uninsured use emergency ser-
vices relatively more than the insured, eliminating such services would
be a way to reduce access by the poor. As the last row of the table shows,
however, there is no statistically significant effect of changes in Medicare
generosity on the availability of these services. The coefficients are statis-
tically insignificant and are opposite in sign to what dropping the tech-
nology would suggest.
The evidence on hospital responses to Medicare cuts thus suggests
that the primary burden of reduced Medicare spending has been on
hospital employees. Employment of nurses has fallen as Medicare has
been cut. There is also some effect of Medicare changes on the probabil-
ity that a hospital closes, but the magnitude of this effect is relatively
small. And there is no evidence that hospitals have cut back on technol-
ogy investment or services for the poor as Medicare has been cut.Incidence of Medicare Reductions25
6. IMPLICATIONS
The evidence in this paper tells a clear story. In the 1980s, Medicare
reimbursement cuts were financed by shifting costs to the private sector;
cost shifting eliminated the need for cost cutting. But in the 1990s, cost
shifting is no longer viable. Hospitals that used to shift costs to the
private sector must now reduce costs as Medicare cuts its reimburse-
ment. The first round of cost cutting appears to have come from hospital
staffRNs in particular. Hospitals have also downsized as Medicare
payments have been reduced. But I find no strong evidence that hospi-
tals have responded to Medicare cuts by reducing their acquisition of
new technologies, or by shutting down services provided disproportion-
ately to the poor.
The central question raised by these results is whether Medicare cuts
have substantial effects on the quality of hospital care. Quality is only
partly related to the availabffity of physical services; it also depends on
nursing quantity and quality and harder to measure aspects such as the
overall organization of the hospital. My results shed no direct evidence
on the quality of hospital care.
Past research on quality of care responses to Medicare cuts can be
used as some guide to the likely effects of these changes. Cutler and
Staiger (1996) suggest that medical technology can be modeled with a
standard production function. As more medical inputs are provided,
patient health improves but at a declining rate. Under the traditional,
fee-for-service medical care system, the incentives were to provide addi-
tional quality until the marginal benefit of medical care was essentially
zero. One would expect that from this point, reductions in Medicare
reimbursement that had only a small effect on hospital profits would
have only a small effect on patient care. This is indeed the finding of
Cutler (1995) and Staiger and Gaumer (1995). Both of these studies
show that in response to Medicare reimbursement changes in the
1980s, some patients died closer to a hospital admission, but these are
largely patients that would have died several months later. There was
no change in the share of patients surviving to one year after the
hospitalization.
One might extrapolate from this finding to conclude that changes in
Medicare reimbursement in the 1990s wifi have similarly small effects on
medical care quality But his conclusion may not be warranted. As the
Medicare cuts increase in size and the abifity to shift cost falls, reductions
in care provided will be increasingly large. One would thus expect the
health implications of Medicare cuts to increase. Evaluating whether26Cutler
recent cuts in Medicare reimbursement have had substantial quality im-
plications is a pressing item for future research.
More generally, these results raise the question about the future of
Medicare cost containment efforts. Public policy has developed a dichot-
omy between Medicare savings from "providers" and savings from
"beneficiaries." Because beneficiary payments are direct, public policy
has shied away from such changes and has favored cuts in provider
payments. To the extent that these payment cuts were shifted to private
insurers, this strategy was equivalent to a tax increase for Medicare. As
Medicare reimbursement cuts increasingly affect provider profits and
thus the money available for patient care, however, the incidence wifi be
much more on Medicare beneficiaries, and on the health system as a
whole.
Almost certainly, this suggests focusing policy options more on other
methods for reducing Medicare costs. Such reforms can take one of two
paths (Cutler, 1996). First, the direct cost of Medicare to beneficiaries can
be increased. This could be done by increasing the premium required for
Part B services or increasing the age of eligibility for Medicare. Second,
Medicare could move away from the fee-for-service model and encour-
age more enrollment in managed care organizations. The Balanced Bud-
get Act of 1997 made some changes along these lines, but additional
changes could be made.
Finally, these results raise questions about the link between Medicare
and the rest of the health care system. Reductions in Medicare reim-
bursement that affect the provision of medical care wifi have effects on
both Medicare beneficiaries and non-Medicare beneficiaries. As cuts in
Medicare increase, it wifi be increasingly important to gauge the impact
of these cuts on those without insurance, since those without insurance
may be most at risk from reducing Medicare spending. It would be a
shame if, in discovering ways to reduce Medicare spending, we did so
by reducing the medical care for those most in need.
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